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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to assess the short term effects of social spending on economic activity. 
Using a panel of OECD countries from 1980 to 2005, the results show that social spending has 
expansionary effects on GDP. In particular, we find that an increase of 1% of social spending 
increases GDP by about 0.1 percentage point, which, given the share of social spending to GDP, 
corresponds to a multiplier of about 0.6. The effect is similar to the one of total government 
spending, and it is larger in periods of severe downturns. Among spending subcategories, social 
spending in Health and Unemployment benefits have the greatest effects. Social spending also 
positively affects private consumption while it has negligible effects on investment. The empirical 
results are economically and statistically significant, and robust. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent revival of interest in fiscal policy issues has revived interest among researchers 
in verifying and understanding the linkages between fiscal policies and economic activity. Over 
the past two decades, a substantial amount of empirical research has been directed towards 
estimating the effect of fiscal policy on output and the existence of crowding-out (negative) versus 
crowding-in (positive) effects on private consumption and investment. While most of this research 
has focused on aggregate spending, several empirical studies have tried to identify the 
components of public expenditure that have the largest effects on economic activity. Among these 
components of public expenditure, social spending has been almost ignored by this stream of the 
literature1. In contrast, previous works have analyzed social spending in the context of income 
inequality and poverty reduction (OECD 2005, OECD 2008), and most recently in the context of 
automatic stabilizers (Darby and Melitz, 2008; Furceri, 2010).  
From a theoretical point of view there are several channels through which social spending 
is likely to affect output in the short term. First, an increase in social spending will increase 
demand by rising public consumption. Second, since a number of social policies target low-
income individuals and credit constrained agents, an increase in social spending is likely to affect 
positively private consumption. Third, some measures of social spending, such as active labour 
market polices, may affect output by increasing employment.  Fourth, social spending in health 
may affect investment by rising human capital and, to the extent that private and public 
investments in the health sector are complementary, by providing medical capital goods. Fifth, an 
increase in social spending may be also associated with distortionary policy actions (such as early 
retirement incentives and invalidity benefits) which may have negative effects on output (via 
reduced labour force participation) both in the short and in the medium term.  
                                               
1See Arjona et al. (2002) for a review of works on the effect of social spending on economic growth.  
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The aim of this paper is to fill the existing gap in the literature and to provide estimates of 
the short term impact of social spending on economic activity.   
From a technical point of view, a common problem in previous studies that assessed the 
impact of government spending on economic activity in a panel framework is the identification of 
exogenous shocks. To address this issue, we estimate for each country a fiscal policy reaction 
function and use the residuals of this regression as exogenous social spending shocks2. These 
exogenous shocks are then used as independent variables in a dynamic growth panel equation. 
We also estimate the impact of government spending in nine different social policy areas: 
i) Old age, ii) Survivors, iii) Incapacity related, iv) Health, v) Family, vi) Active labor market 
programme, vii) Unemployment benefits, viii) Housing, and ix) Other policy areas. 
The results suggest that social spending has a significant short term effect on output. In 
particular, we found that an increase of 1% of social spending increases GDP by about 0.1 
percentage point after one year, which, given the share of social spending to GDP, corresponds to 
a multiplier of about 0.6. The multiplier is only slightly larger than the one obtained using the 
same empirical approach for total government spending. While, one could expect a significant 
higher multiplier for social spending, the results suggest no significant difference. The reason is to 
be found in the large heterogeneity in the components of social spending and their effects on 
output. In particular, among the nine different policies are considered only Health, Unemployment 
benefits and Survivors have a statistically significant effect. 
                                               
2
 A similar approach has been used by Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2006) to assess the effect of the volatility of fiscal 
policy shock on long-term growth, by Afonso et al. (2010) to assess the determinants of discretionary spending and 
revenue volatility, and more recently by Corsetti and Mueller (2010) to examine the effects of government spending 
on output during periods of crises. 
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We also find that the effect of social spending on output is larger in periods of severe 
downturns, while is similar between countries with low and high debt-to-GDP ratios, and between 
countries with large and small levels of trade openness. 
 Finally, we also test the existence of crowding-out (negative) versus crowding-in 
(positive) effects on consumption and investment. The results suggest that while social spending 
has a positive and significant impact on consumption, it has negligible and insignificant effects on 
private investment.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data and 
descriptive statistics regarding social spending in the OECD countries. Section three discusses the 
empirical methodology used to assess the impact of social spending on economic activity. Finally, 
the last section concludes with the main summary. 
 
2. Data 
 
 Data are taken from the OECD databases. Data for income variables are retrieved from the 
OECD National Accounts dataset while data for social spending are taken from the OECD Social 
and Welfare statistics. The availability of social spending variables shortens the estimation period 
from 1980 to 2005 (See Annex 1 for data availability). 
  Total social spending contributes to a significant share of government expenditure and of 
GDP. On average, about 46 percent (21) of total government spending (GDP) is represented by 
social spending (Table 1).  
 Among the different policy areas in which social spending is allocated, Old Age and 
Health are by far the largest components of social expenditure. In particular, on average, Old Age 
and Health represent respectively the 14.5 and 12.5 percent of total government spending. 
Interestingly, the third largest category is Incapacity Related spending, while spending in 
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Unemployment benefits, Active Labor Market Programme and Housing are much smaller. Family 
related spending has also a significant share. 
 Total social spending differs considerably among countries (Figure 1). In particular, while 
in some countries (such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and 
Sweden) social spending is systematically above the average (about 21 percent of GDP), in other 
countries (such as Australia, Canada, Korea, Ireland, Iceland, Mexico and the United States) it is 
systematically below. 
 In contrast, there are no large differences across countries over time. In fact, for most of 
the countries in the sample (exceptions are represented by the Netherlands, New Zealand and the 
Slovak Republic) social spending (as share of GDP) shows an upward trend. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology  
 
To assess the impact of public spending and revenue on output a standard approach 
(initiated by Romer and Romer, 1989) is to estimate a dynamic growth equation and derive 
impulse response functions from the estimated coefficients. Analogously, a way to estimate the 
impact of social spending and its subcategories on output is to estimate a dynamic growth 
equation of the following form: 
                                  ∆    	  ∑ ∆,′   

                                  (1)                        
and to derive the corresponding impulse response functions from the estimated . Where y is the 
log of output, s is the log of total social spending (or its sub-categories),  country-fixed effects 
and 	 time-fixed effects. X is a vector of control variables which can affect growth in the short 
term, such as the log of openness, population growth and investment as share of GDP. 
 Equation (1) can also be modified to correct for possible autocorrelation as: 
                       ∆    	   ∑ ∆,

  ∑ ∆,′   

                   (2) 
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However, a standard problem with equation (1) and (2) is that the OLS estimates of  can 
be biased due to reverse causality, or endogeneity, as an increase in the GDP may affect social 
spending via automatic stabilizers or by inducing policy makers to set a contractionary stance. 
Reverse causation takes the form of: 
                                                            ∆  ∆                                                                (3) 
As suggested by a growing literature in health and labor economics3, several categories of 
social spending may respond to the economic cycle and work as automatic stabilizers. For 
example, pension related spending may increase during downturns since firms may provide 
incentives to workers to early retirement; health spending may increase during recessions due to 
the fact that a higher number of people are usually found to report illness4. The cyclicality of 
social spending has been thoroughly analyzed by Darby and Melitz (2008), which, estimating 
fiscal reaction functions for nine categories of social spending find that several components of 
social spending (such as Unemployment benefits, Health, Retirement and Incapacity related 
spending) are counter-cyclical. 
Based on this evidence it is likely that   0. Assuming positive values for    , equation 
(2) and (3) produce opposite signs in the correlation of social spending and growth which implies 
that the simple OLS estimate of  are likely to be biased downward. In other words, the OLS 
estimates of equation (1) may suggest concluding the absence of any significant effect of social 
spending on output even if theoretically the effect is present and positive. To deal with this 
endogeneity issue we try to identify government spending shocks by estimating a policy rule for 
social spending. A similar approach has been used by Fatás and Mihov (2003,2006) to assess the 
                                               
3
 See, for example, Black et al. (2002); Boone and van Ours (2002) Autor and Duggan (2003); Beatty et al. (2000); 
Coile and Levine (2006); Holmulund (2004); Johansson et al. (2006); Ruhm (2006); Ruhm and Black (2002); and 
TapiaGranados (2005). 
4
 At the same time, health spending may increase during booms since as the pace of work is greater, there may be 
more work accidents, especially in dangerous industries. 
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effect of the volatility of fiscal policy shocks on long-term growth, by Afonso et al. (2010) to 
assess the determinants of spending volatility, and more recently by Corsetti and Mueller (2010) 
to examine the effects of government spending on output during periods of crises. In particular, 
the approach we consider is to estimate for each country the following fiscal reaction function: 
                          ∆     !"  ∑ #∆
$
  ∑ ∆%′&  
$
                       (4)                
where Z is a set of control variables including the initial level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, election 
dummies and the initial level of the ratio of total social spending to GDP. The residuals of the 
regression obtained for each country, '  , are then used in the second-step to estimate the short 
term impact of social spending on output: 
                       ∆    	   ∑ ∆,

  ∑ ̂,′   

                     (5) 
To address the fact that social spending shocks are estimates (unobserved), we make use of 
the sandwich estimator of the estimated covariance matrix of the second-step (Hardin, 2002), 
which has also the advantage to correct for heteroskedasticity.5 
 Finally, in order to assess whether social spending produces short term crowding-out 
versus crowding-in effects we re-estimate equation (5) for consumption growth (∆)): 
                       ∆)    	    ∑ ∆),

  ∑ ̂,′   

                      (6) 
and investment growth (∆*): 
                       ∆*    	   ∑ ∆*,

  ∑ ̂,′   

                      (7) 
 
 
 
                                               
5
 As pointed out by Murphy and Topel (1985) in their seminal paper, a problem in using unobserved (estimated) 
regressors is that inferential analysis based on unadjusted standard errors fails to account for the fact that imputed 
regressors are measured with sampling errors. As a consequence, hypothesis tests based on the estimated covariance 
matrix of the second-step estimator are biased, even in large sample. In addition, since the regressors are estimated 
separately for each country it is likely that the error term of the second-step regression may be heteroskedastic. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Social Spending on Economic Activity 
We start our empirical analysis by estimating the effect of an increase in social spending 
on output as described in equation (1). The results of the estimation are reported in the first 
column of Table 26. Looking at the results it seems that social spending has no effect on output. 
This finding is confirmed also when the lagged values of the GDP growth rate are included in the 
analysis (column 2). However, as discussed in the previous section, the reverse causation between 
growth and social spending produces a downward bias in the estimates which brings the effect 
toward zero. Indeed, once we control for this, by using as independent variable the estimated 
social spending shocks in equation (4)7, the effect of social spending turns out to be positive and 
statistically significant (third and fourth column of Table 2, and Figure 2)8. Given that in equation 
(4) we control for the trend in social spending, the results also imply that while an exogenous 
shock has a significant impact a steady increase in social spending will not increase economic 
activity.9 
In particular, a 1% increase in social spending increases output by 0.12 percent in the short 
term and by about 0.25 after three years. Given that we control in equation (4) for the initial level 
of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the increase in social spending has to be interpreted as social spending 
shock which leaves the debt-to-GDP ratio unchanged.   
                                               
6
 The coefficients of the controls variables included in the estimation are statistically significant and with the expected 
signs. 
7
 The results of the first stage estimation suggest that in general social spending is counter-cyclical in most of the 
countries. Countries with higher public debt and with a higher initial level of the ratio of total social spending to GDP 
are characterized by a lower social spending growth. The results are available from the authors upon request.  
8
 The number of observations is significantly reduced due to the short series of the debt-to-GDP ratio for several 
countries. This also determines an unbalanced panel. To check for robustness of the results we have also replicated 
the estimates including only those countries for which the debt series goes back until 1980. The results are extremely 
robust both in terms of magnitude of the coefficients and the total effect. 
9
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation. 
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The estimated effect is unaffected by the inclusion of the lagged value of GDP growth. In 
terms of multiplier effects, the estimates imply that an increase of social spending of 1 percent of 
GDP increases output by 0.57 percentage point10.  
Given the absence of previous empirical studies focusing on social spending we do not 
have a benchmark of comparison for our estimates. For this purpose, we replicate our analysis 
using total government spending. The results obtained using the latter are similar to those 
obtained using social spending (Table 3). In particular, the results in the third and fourth column 
of Table 3 suggest that a 1% increase in total government spending increases output by about 0.22 
percent after one year, which corresponds to a short term multiplier of about 0.51.  
Overall, the results are in line with the range of short term multipliers’ estimates of total 
government spending presented in previous empirical studies. In particular, they are consistent 
with estimates from structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models, from large multinational 
macro models (Henry et al., 2008) and from DSGE models (Coenen et al., 2010). 
4.1.1 Asymmetric Effects  
 The effect of social spending on economic activity may also differ between different 
phases of economic cycles (Perotti, 1999, 2004). In fact, during downturns the share of agents that 
are liquidity constrained tends to increase, reducing therefore the contraction in aggregate private 
consumption due to Ricardian motives, and therefore magnifying the effect of spending shocks. 
To examine the existence of this asymmetric effect we estimate the following equation: 
  ∆    	    ∑ ∆,

  ∑ ̂,0
+  ∑ ̂,0
′   



         (8) 
where 0+ (0) is a dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 when the output gap11 is greater 
(lower) than zero, and zero otherwise. The first column of Table 4 summarizes the results and 
                                               
10The multiplier effect is computed by multiplying the estimated elasticity by the inverse of the share of social 
spending to GDP: 0.12*(Y/S) =0.12*4.76=0.57. 
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shows that the effect of social spending on output does not vary according to different phases of 
the economic cycle. However, while the effect is similar during upturns and downturns, it may 
still vary between periods of normal times and severe downturns. Indeed, it is possible to argue 
that asymmetries in the effect of fiscal policy may arise only during severe shocks, in which the 
share of agents that are liquidity constrained increases more markedly. To test for this hypothesis 
we re-estimate equation 6, assuming 0+ (0) to take the value equal to 1 when the GDP growth 
rate is greater (lower) than -1%, and zero otherwise. The results reported in the second column of 
Table 3 indicate the presence of asymmetric effects and suggest that social spending has larger 
effects during severe downturns (mostly after 2 and 3 years of the initial social spending sock).12  
  Another source of asymmetry can arise from the level of public debt (Blanchard, 1990, 
Sutherlands, 1995). In particular, if the debt-to-GDP ratio is high agents can expect future 
consolidation measures and therefore reduce current consumption in response to an increase in 
government spending. To test for this hypothesis we re-estimate equation (6) by constructing 0+ 
(0) as a dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above 
(below) 60% and zero otherwise. The results are reported in the third column of Table 4 and 
suggest that the effect of social spending on output is not statistically different between countries 
with high and low public debt. 
 Finally, another source of asymmetry that we test is related to trade openness. In fact, form 
a theoretical point of view is possible to expect that the effectiveness of a spending shock is larger 
in more closed economies. To test this hypothesis we classify the countries in the sample in two 
groups based on their level of trade openness. In particular, 0+ (0) takes the value equal to 1 
                                                                                                                                                         
11
  Data for output gap are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook database, where potential output is derived from 
a production function approach (Beffy et al., 2006).  
12
 The results are robust to different threshold levels (-2%, -3%, -4%) and are available from the authors upon request. 
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when the share of exports and imports over GDP is greater (lower) than 75%13, and zero 
otherwise. The last column of Table 4 summarizes the results and show that the effect of 
government spending is not statistically different between relatively more closed and open 
economies. 
 
4.2 Categories of Social Spending 
 In this section we investigate which component of social spending contributes more to the 
positive effect on output. To this purpose, for each of the categories of social spending presented 
in Section 2 we construct a measure of exogenous shocks. This measure is then used to estimate 
equation (6). Given the robustness of the results to the inclusion of past values of the GDP growth 
rates in the specification, we report the results for the regression without the lags of the dependent 
variable. This has the advantage to avoid endogeneity problems due to the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable in a panel framework14. The results for each of the sub-categories of social 
spending are presented in Table 5. Looking at the result we can notice that the categories for 
which there is a significant effect on output are Health and Unemployment benefits, and to a 
lesser extent Survivors (Figure 3). In particular, Health has a significant impact up to three years 
after the initial shock.  However, while in terms of elasticities Health spending is the most 
efficient one, in terms of multipliers effect Unemployment benefits is the social spending category 
that produces the largest effect on output. In particular, the short term multipliers associated to 
                                               
13
 This number corresponds to the average of openness in our sample. As an additional test we have also estimated a 
specification in which openness enters as an interaction term with social spending growth in equation (5). The results 
still point to the absence of asymmetric effects.  
14
 The results are still robust to the inclusion of the lags of GDP growth. 
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Health and Unemployment benefits are 0.9 and 2.1, respectively. In other words, an increase of 1 
percent of GDP in Health (Unemployment benefits) spending increases output by 0.9 (2.1)15.  
 These results confirm and complement the evidence of Darby and Melitz (2008) and 
Furceri (2010) which suggest that Health and Unemployment benefits are those categories of 
social spending which provide more insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. 
 
4.3 Crowding in versus Crowding-out Effects? 
From a theoretical point of view there is no consensus on the effect of spending shocks on 
consumption and investment.  The standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model predicts a decline 
in private consumption in response to a rise in government spending (Aiyagari et al., 1990; Baxter 
and King, 1993; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; and Fatás and Mihov, 2001), while the 
standard IS-LM model predicts that consumption should rise in response to a positive government 
spending shock (Blanchard, 2003). Similarly to consumption, the two theories also predict 
different outcomes for investment. The standard RBC model claims that an increase of 
government consumption will have a positive effect on investment while the standard IS-LM 
model predicts that investment should decline in response to a positive government spending 
shock. From an empirical point of view the evidence is also non-conclusive16.  
To test whether social spending has crowding-in or crowding-out effects on consumption 
and investment we estimate equation (6) and (7). Starting with consumption, the results are 
displayed in the second column of Table 6 and in Figure 4B. Looking both at the table and the 
figure, it is apparent that social spending has a positive short term impact on consumption. In 
particular, a 1% increase in total spending increases private consumption by 0.35 percent in the 
                                               
15
 The multiplier effects are computed by multiplying the estimated elasticity by the inverse of the share of Health and 
Unemployment benefits over GDP. 
16
 See Furceri and Sousa (2009) for a review of the empirical works on this issue. 
13 
 
three years after the initial spending shock. Among the categories of social spending, Health, 
Unemployment benefits and Survivors are those that have statistically significant effects (Table 7 
and Figure 5) and among these three categories, Unemployment benefits are those associated with 
the largest multiplier. This is consistent with the idea that Unemployment benefits are targeted 
measures to liquidity constrained agents, for which the increase in consumption is expected to be 
the largest. 
In contrast, the effect of social spending (considered as a whole) on investment is not statistically 
significant (Table 6 and Figure 4C). Among its sub-categories, the only component that produces 
a strong statistically significant effect is Health spending (Table 8 and Figure 6). This result is in 
line with Wang, (2005) which find that health spending has positive short term effects on private 
investment. Unemployment benefits and Survivors are also found to affect investment but only at 
a significance level of 10%. Despite the significant effect of these three categories, the fact that 
total social spending is not statistically significant seems to be driven by the large negative effect 
of Old Age which accounts for a large part of total spending.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 This paper analyzes the short term impact of social spending on economic activity for a 
panel of OECD countries from 1980 to 2005. To this purpose we use a two-step approach. In the 
first step we construct a measure of exogenous social spending shock, by regressing for each 
country a policy rule in which the growth rate of social spending is regressed against its lagged 
values, the current and past growth rate of GDP, the initial level of debt, the share of social 
spending over GDP and election dummies. The residuals of this regression are then considered as 
exogenous social spending shocks. In the second step, we assess the effect of these shocks on 
economic activity. 
14 
 
The results suggest that social spending has a significant short term effect on output, 
especially during downturns. In particular, we found that an increase of 1% of social spending 
increases GDP by about 0.1 percentage point after one year, which, given the share of social 
spending to GDP, corresponds to a multiplier of about 0.6. Given the absence of previous 
empirical studies focusing on social spending we do not have a benchmark of comparison for our 
estimates. For this purpose, we replicated our analysis using total government spending. The 
results obtained using the latter suggest that a 1% increase in total government spending increases 
output by about 0.22 percent after one year, which corresponds to a short term multiplier of about 
0.51. While, one could expect a significant higher multiplier for social spending, the results 
suggest no significant difference. The reason is to be found in the large heterogeneity in the 
components of social spending and their effects on output. 
 Social spending is classified in nine policy areas: i) Old age, ii) Survivors, iii) Incapacity 
related, iv) Health, v) Family, vi) Active labor market programme, vii) Unemployment benefits, 
viii) Housing, and ix) Other policy areas. Among these categories, only social spending devoted 
to Health, Unemployment and Survivors have a statistically significant effect on economic 
activity. 
 Finally, we also test the existence of crowding-out versus crowding-in effects on 
consumption and investment. The results suggest that while social spending has a positive and 
significant impact on consumption (mostly determined by Health and Unemployment benefits 
spending), it has a negligible and insignificant impact on private investment (with spending 
devoted to Health being the only category with a significant and positive effect).    
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
References 
 
Arjona, R., Ladaique, M., and Pearson, M. (2002) “Social protection and Growth”, OECD 
Economic Studies, 35, 1-39. 
 
Afonso, A., Agnello, L. and D. Furceri, (2010). “Fiscal policy responsiveness, persistence and 
discretion”, Public Choice, 145(3), 503-530. 
 
Autor, D. H. and Duggan, M. (2003), “The rise in the disability rolls and the decline in 
unemployment,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1), 157-205. 
 
Aiyagari, R.; Christiano, L.; Eichenbaum, M. (1990), “Output, employment and interest rate 
effects of government consumption”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 30, 73–86.  
 
Baldacci, E., Clements, B., Gupta, S., and Cui, Q. (2008). “Social Spending, Human Capital, and 
Growth in Developing Countries,” World Development, 36(8), 1317-1341. 
 
Baxter, M.; King, R. (1993), “Fiscal policy in general equilibrium”, American Economic Review, 
83, 315–334.  
 
Beatty, C., S. Fothergill and Macmillan, R. (2000), “A Theory of Employment, Unemployment 
and Sickness,” Regional Studies, 34 (7), 617-630. 
 
Beffy P.O., P. Ollivaud, P. Richardson and F. Sédillot (2006), “New OECD Methods for Supply-Side and 
Medium-Term Assessments: A Capital Services Approach”, OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper, No. 482. 
 
Black, D., Kermit D., and Sanders,S. (2002), “The Impact of Economic Conditions on 
Participation in Disability Programs: Evidence from the Coal Boom and Bust,” American 
Economic Review, 92, 27–50. 
 
Blanchard, O., (1990). “Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? Tales of Two Small 
European Countries: Comment”. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 5, pp. 111–116.  
 
Blanchard, O. and Perotti,R. (2002). “An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of 
Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 
1329-1368. 
 
Blanchard, O. (2003), Macroeconomics, 3rd ed., Prentice Hall.  
 
Boone, Jan and van Ours, J. (2002), “Cyclical Fluctuations in Workplace Accidents,” CEPR 
Discussion Paper 3655, subsequently published in revised form as “Are recessions good for 
workplace safety?” Journal of Health Economics, 2006, 25, 1069–1093. 
 
Christiano, L.; Eichenbaum, M. (1992), “Current real business cycles theories and aggregate labor 
market fluctuations”, American Economic Review, 82, 430–450.  
 
16 
 
Coenen, G., C. Erceg, C. Freedman, D. Furceri, M. Kumhof, R.Lalonde, D. Laxton, J. Lindé, A. 
Mourougane, D. Muir, S.Mursula, C. de Resende, J.Roberts, W. Roeger, S. Snudden, M. 
Trabandt, and Jan in„t Veld (2010), “Effect of Fiscal Stimulus in Structural Models”, IMF 
Working Paper, No. 1073. 
 
Coile, C. and Levine, P., (2006), “Labor Market Shocks and Retirement: Do Government 
Programs Matter?” NBER Working Paper No. W12559, October. 
 
Corsetti, G. and G. Mueller (2010). “The effectiveness monetary policy depends on the financing 
and the monetary policy mix”, Mimeo. 
 
Darby, J. and Melitz, J. (2008) “Social spending and automatic stabilizers in the OECD”, 
Economic Policy, 56, 715-756. 
 
Fatas, A.; Mihov, I. (2001), “The effects of fiscal policy on consumption and employment: theory 
and evidence”, CEPR Discussion Paper Nº. 2760. 
 
Fatás, A. and Mihov, I. (2003). “The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118, 1419-1447. 
 
Fatás, A. and Mihov, I. (2006). “The Macroeconomics Effects of Fiscal Rules in the US States”, 
Journal of Public Economics, 90, 101-117. 
 
Furceri, D. and R. Sousa (2009), “The Impact of Government Spending on the Private Sector: 
Crowding out versus Crowding-in Effects”, NIPE Working Papers 6. 
 
Furceri,D.(2010). “Stabilization Effects of Social Spending: Empirical Evidence from OECD 
Countries”, North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 21 (1), 34-48. 
 
Giavazzi, F., Jappelli, T. and Pagano, M. (2000). “Searching for non-linear effects of fiscal policy: 
Evidence from industrial and developing countries”, European Economic Review, 44(7), 1259-
1289. 
 
Hardin, J.A. (2002). “The robust variance estimator for two-stage models” Stata Journal, 2(3), 
253-266. 
 
Henry, J., P. Hernandez de Cos and S. Momigliano (2008), “The Impact of Government Budgets 
on Prices: Evidence from Macroeconometric Models”, Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 30(1), 
pp. 123-143. 
 
Holmlund, B. (2004). “Sickness absence and search unemployment”, Working Paper Series 
2004:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. 
 
Johansson, E., Böckerman, P., Prättälä, R. and Uutela, A. (2006), “Alcohol-related mortality, 
drinking behavior, and business cycles - Are slumps really dry seasons?” European Journal of 
Health Economics, 7 (3), 212-217. 
 
17 
 
McVicar, D. (2006). “Why do disability benefit rolls vary between regions? A review of evidence 
from the US and UK,” Regional Studies, 40, No. 5, 519-533. 
 
Murphy and Topel (1985). “Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models”, Journal 
of Business and Economic Statistics, 3(4), 370-379.  
 
OECD (2009), Economic Outlook Interim report, March.  
 
OECD (2007), Society at a Glance – OECD Social Indicators 2006. 
 
OECD (2005), Extending Opportunities – How Active Social Policy Can Benefit Us All. 
 
Perotti, R., (1999). Fiscal policy when things are going badly. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
114, 1399–1436. 
 
Perotti, R. (2004). “Estimating the effects of fiscal policy in OECD countries”, University of 
Bocconi, Working Paper 276. 
 
Romer,C. and D. Romer (1989), “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman 
and Schwartz”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 4: 121-170. 
 
Ruhm, C. (2006). “Macroeconomic conditions, health and mortality,” 5–16, in Andrew Jones, ed., 
Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Ruhm, C., and Black,W. (2002). “Does drinking really decrease in bad times,” Journal of Health 
Economics, 21 (4), 659-678. 
 
Sutherland, A., (1997). Fiscal crises and aggregate demand: Can high public debt reverse the 
effects of fiscal policy. Journal of Public Economics 65. 
 
Tapia Granados, J. (2005), “Increasing mortality during the expansions of the US economy,” 
1900-1996,” International Journal of Epidemiology, 34, No. 6, 1194-1202. 
 
Wang, B. (2005). “Effects of government expenditure on private investment: Canadian empirical 
evidence”, Empirical Economics, 30, 493-504. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Table1.Average Social Spending Shares 
 
 
%  of Total 
Expenditure 
% of GDP 
Total 45.5 21.0 
Old Age 14.5 6.8 
Survivors 1.4 0.8 
Incapacity Related 5.6 2.8 
Health 12.5 5.5 
Family 4.9 0.7 
Active Labor Market Programme 1.5 0.7 
Unemployment 2.7 1.3 
Housing 0.9 0.4 
Other Policy Areas 1.4 0.6 
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Table 2.The Effects of Social Spending on Ouptut 
 
 Endogenous Shocka Exogenous Shockb 
Growtht-1 - 0.207 
(4.37)*** 
- 0.290 
(1.75)* 
Growtht-2 - -0.105 
(-2.27)** 
- -0.132 
(-2.33)** 
Growtht-3 - -0.020 
(-0.48) 
- -0.080 
(-1.20) 
     
Log Opennesst 0.785 
(2.15)** 
0.822 
(3.82)*** 
3.953 
(3.27)*** 
3.288 
(2.81)*** 
(Investment/GDP)t-1 0.245 
(4.93)*** 
0.238 
(4.86)*** 
0.181 
(2.94)*** 
0.144 
(1.91)* 
Population Growtht -1.517 
(-0.21) 
-58.150 
(-2.19)** 
-44.365 
(-1.12) 
-43.554 
(-1.15) 
     
Social Spendingt 0.040 
(0.86) 
0.056 
(2.74)*** 
0.122 
(2.01)** 
0.120 
(2.11)** 
Social Spendingt-1 -0.011 
(-0.38) 
-0.290 
(-1.42) 
0.031 
(0.54) 
0.013 
(0.24) 
Social Spendingt-2 -0.012 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
-0.012 
(-0.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
Social Spendingt-3 -0.009 
(-0.37) 
-0.006 
(-0.34) 
0.100 
(1.50) 
0.107 
(1.70)* 
     
Total Effect 0.008 
(0.04) 
0.020 
(0.77) 
0.241 
(2.36)** 
0.264 
(2.34)** 
     
N 548 545 345 345 
R2 0.42 0.45 0.53 0.58 
a
 Growth rate of government social spending. 
b
 Computed as residual of equation (4). 
***, **, *denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. T-statistics in parenthesis (Robust standard errors).  
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Table 3.The Effects of Social Spending vs Total Government Spending 
 
 Social Spendinga  Total Government Spendinga  
Growtht-1 - 0.290 
(1.75)* 
- 0.401 
(3.34)*** 
Growtht-2 - -0.132 
(-2.33)** 
- -0.122 
(-1.89)* 
Growtht-3 - -0.080 
(-1.20) 
- -0.019 
(-0.33) 
     
Log Opennesst 3.953 
(3.27)*** 
3.288 
(2.81)*** 
1.788 
(1.83)* 
1.076 
(1.14) 
(Investment/GDP)t-1 0.181 
(2.94)*** 
0.144 
(1.91)* 
0.188 
(3.25)*** 
0.104 
(1.76)* 
Population Growtht -44.365 
(-1.12) 
-43.554 
(-1.15) 
-36.459 
(-1.01) 
-41.488 
(-1.34) 
     
Spendingt 0.122 
(2.01)** 
0.120 
(2.11)** 
0.222 
(2.63)*** 
0.220 
(2.77)*** 
Spendingt-1 0.031 
(0.54) 
0.013 
(0.24) 
0.170 
(1.88)* 
0.096 
(0.24) 
Spendingt-2 -0.012 
(-0.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.079 
(-1.02) 
-0.112 
(-1.44) 
Spendingt-3 0.100 
(1.50) 
0.107 
(1.70)* 
0.044 
(0.66) 
0.115 
(1.74)* 
     
Total Effect 0.241 
(2.36)** 
0.264 
(2.34)** 
0.356 
(2.22)** 
0.319 
(2.07)** 
     
N 345 345 428 428 
R2 0.53 0.58 0.52 0.58 
a
 Computed as residual of equation (4). 
***, **, *denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. T-statistics in parenthesis (Robust standard errors).  
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Table 4.Asymmetrci Effects over the Cycle 
 
 Cycle Normal Timesa 
vs. Severe 
Downturnsb 
Debt Openness 
Social Spendingt0+ 0.083 
(0.99) 
0.094 
(1.62)* 
0.052 
(0.65) 
0.123 
(1.65)* 
Social Spendingt-10+ 0.114 
(1.22) 
0.069 
(1.11) 
0.076 
(0.88) 
0.125 
(1.49) 
Social Spendingt-20+ 0.008 
(0.07) 
-0.054 
(-0.81) 
0.081 
(1.01) 
-0.039 
(-0.54) 
Social Spendingt-30+ 0.054 
(0.47) 
0.082 
(1.21) 
0.020 
(0.22) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
Total Effect0+ 0.259 
(1.44) 
0.191  
(1.86)* 
0.229 
(1.67)* 
0.208 
(1.53) 
     
Social Spendingt0- 0.107 
(1.24) 
0.304 
(0.72) 
0.152 
(1.76)* 
0.068 
(0.82) 
Social Spendingt-10- 0.014 
(0.17) 
0.069 
(1.11) 
0.028 
(0.32) 
-0.005 
(-0.07) 
Social Spendingt-20- -0.021 
(-0.29) 
1.008 
(3.75)*** 
-0.120 
(-1.26) 
0.009 
(0.09) 
Social Spendingt-30- 0.124 
(1.57) 
0.786 
(4.70)*** 
0.200 
(2.19) 
0.174 
(1.87)* 
Total Effect 0.224 
(1.64)* 
2.167 
(2.50)** 
0.260 
(1.84)* 
0.246 
(2.34)** 
 
    
Difference in total 
effect(P-value) 
0.89 0.02** 0.87 0.84 
     
N 548 545 345 345 
R2 0.42 0.45 0.53 0.58 
Note: Control variables included but not reported. 
a Defined as periods in which the growth rate of GDP >-1%. 
b
 Defined as periods in which the growth rate of GDP <-1%. 
***, **, *denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. T-statistics in parenthesis (Robust standard errors).  
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Table 5. The Effects of Social Spending Categories on Output (Elasticities-%) 
 HE UN AC OA SU IN FA HO OT 
          
Social 
Spendingt 
0.050 
(1.75)* 
0.028 
(3.42)*** 
0.002 
(0.24) 
-0.019 
(-0.55) 
0.012 
(0.80) 
-0.011 
(-0.48) 
0.008 
(0.71) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
0.004 
(0.66) 
Social 
Spendingt-1 
0.075 
(2.28)** 
0.006 
(0.73) 
-0.007 
(-0.47) 
0.067 
(1.20) 
0.016 
(1.83)* 
0.023 
(1.06) 
-0.010 
(-0.86) 
-0.004 
(-0.60) 
0.008 
(1.56) 
Social 
Spendingt-2 
0.035 
(1.00) 
0.015 
(1.80)* 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
-0.004 
(-0.09) 
0.009 
(0.82) 
0.017 
(0.81) 
-0.003 
(-0.26) 
-0.010 
(-1.61) 
0.004 
(1.00) 
Social 
Spendingt-3 
0.073 
(2.10)** 
0.010 
(1.19) 
-0.004 
(-0.28) 
-0.042 
(-0.68) 
0.013 
(1.40) 
-0.003 
(-0.16) 
-0.017 
(-1.01) 
-0.003 
(-0.30) 
-0.007 
(-1.12) 
          
Total 
Effect 
0.233 
(2.65)*** 
0.059 
(3.04)*** 
-0.009 
(-0.25) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.049 
(2.29)** 
0.025 
(0.52) 
-0.022 
(-0.69) 
-0.018 
(-0.94) 
0.006 
(0.65) 
          
N 360 351 322 
 
352 352 352 354 275 330 
R2 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.63 0.54 
Note: Note: Control variables included but not reported. 
 HE=Health; UN=Unemployment benefits; AC=Active labor market programmes; OA=Old age; SU=Survivors; IN=Incapacity related; HO=housing; OT=Others. 
***, **, *denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. T-statistics in parenthesis (Robust standard errors).  
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Table 6.The Effects of Social Spending on Ouptut, Consumption and Investment (%) 
 
 GDP Consumption Investment 
    
Log Opennesst 3.953 
(3.27)*** 
4.554 
(2.63)*** 
11.837 
(2.59)*** 
(Investment/GDP)t-1 0.181 
(2.94)*** 
0.306 
(3.36)*** 
1.129 
(4.70)*** 
Population Growtht -44.365 
(-1.12) 
-55.882 
(-0.98) 
-322.383 
(-2.05)*** 
    
Social Spendingt 0.122 
(2.01)** 
0.166 
(2.08)** 
0.141 
(0.57) 
Social Spendingt-1 -0.31 
(0.54) 
0.007 
(1.26) 
-0.110 
(-0.47) 
Social Spendingt-2 -0.012 
(-0.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
0.105 
(0.42) 
Social Spendingt-3 0.100 
(1.50) 
0.076 
(1.05)* 
0.047 
(0.21) 
    
Total Effect 0.241 
(2.36)** 
0.346 
(2.60)*** 
0.183 
(0.49) 
    
N 345 345 345 
R2 0.53 0.39 0.45 
    
 ***, **, *denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. T-statistics in parenthesis (Robust 
standard errors).  
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Table 7. The Effects of Social Spending Categories on Consumption (Elasticities-%) 
 HE UN AC OA SU IN FA HO OT 
          
Social 
Spendingt 
0.074 
(1.37) 
0.030 
(2.75)** 
0.021 
(1.54) 
-0.046 
(-0.90) 
0.034 
(1.88)* 
-0.033 
(-1.05) 
0.019 
(1.33) 
0.008 
(0.98) 
0.007 
(1.04) 
Social 
Spendingt-1 
0.095 
(1.70)* 
0.029 
(2.31)** 
-0.003 
(-0.15) 
0.117 
(1.52) 
0.031 
(2.38)** 
-0.003 
(-0.10) 
0.014 
(0.98) 
-0.016 
(-1.78)* 
0.010 
(1.45) 
Social 
Spendingt-2 
0.009 
(0.16) 
0.012 
(1.17) 
0.012 
(0.63) 
0.003 
(0.04) 
-0.017 
(-1.21) 
-0.011 
(-0.38) 
0.014 
(1.07) 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
-0.004 
(-0.71) 
Social 
Spendingt-3 
0.08 
(0.15) 
0.013 
(1.23) 
-0.027 
(-1.11) 
-0.121 
(-1.38) 
0.021 
(1.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.18) 
-0.023 
(-1.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
-0.006 
(-0.79) 
          
Total 
Effect 
0.186 
(1.37)* 
0.078 
(3.07)*** 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.048 
(-0.33) 
0.069 
(1.96)** 
-0.052 
(-0.79) 
0.024 
(0.61) 
-0.010 
(-0.42) 
0.007 
(0.37) 
          
N 360 351 322 352 352 352 354 275 330 
R2 0.39 0.47 0.47 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.51 0.38 
Note: Note: Control variables included but not reported. 
HE=Health; UN=Unemployment benefits; AC=Active labor market programmes; OA=Old age; SU=Survivors; IN=Incapacity related; HO=housing; OT=Others. 
***, **, *denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. T-statistics in parenthesis (Robust standard errors).  
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Table 8. The Effects of Social Spending Categories on Investment (Elasticities-%) 
 HE UN AC OA SU IN FA HO OT 
          
Social 
Spendingt 
0.121 
(1.05) 
0.078 
(2.35)** 
0.018 
(0.38) 
-0.134 
(-1.04) 
0.048 
(1.15) 
-0.100 
(-1.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.35) 
0.049 
(1.27) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
Social 
Spendingt-1 
0.190 
(1.60) 
0.002 
(0.05) 
-0.046 
(-0.93) 
0.113 
(0.72) 
0.067 
(2.06)** 
0.031 
(0.37) 
0.19 
(0.48) 
0.011 
(0.90) 
0.007 
(0.42) 
Social 
Spendingt-2 
0.172 
(1.43) 
0.042 
(1.37) 
0.045 
(1.17) 
-0.016 
(-0.12) 
0.010 
(0.20) 
0.029 
(0.36) 
-0.011 
(-0.26) 
-0.031 
(-1.18) 
0.008 
(0.54) 
Social 
Spendingt-3 
0.142 
(1.10) 
0.021 
(0.65) 
0.017 
(0.31) 
-0.111 
(-0.62) 
0.010 
(0.30) 
-0.013 
(-0.15) 
-0.011 
(-0.21) 
0.040 
(1.20 
-0.028 
(-1.56) 
          
Total 
Effect 
0.626 
(2.22)** 
0.143 
(1.91)* 
0.033 
(0.28) 
-0.149 
(-0.51) 
0.135 
(1.69)* 
-0.053 
(-0.30) 
-0.016 
(-0.17) 
0.081 
(1.01) 
0.007 
(0.28) 
          
N 360 351 322 352 352 352 354 275 330 
R2 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.54 0.46 
Note: Note: Control variables included but not reported. 
HE=Health; UN=Unemployment benefits; AC=Active labor market programmes; OA=Old age; SU=Survivors; IN=Incapacity related; HO=housing; OT=Others. 
***, **, *denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. T-statistics in parenthesis (Robust standard errors).  
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Figure 1. Total Social Spending over time (% GDP) 
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Figure 2. The Effects of an Exogenous Social Spending Shock on Output (%) 
 
 
A. No Growth Lags 
 
 
 
 
B. With Growth Lags 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Years after the shock in horizontal axes. 90% confidence bands. 
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Figure 3.The Effect of Social Spending Categories on Output (Elasticities-%) 
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Note: Years after the shock in horizontal axes. Solid lines=average response. Dotted lines=90% confidence bands. 
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Figure 4. The Effects of Exogenous Social Spending Shocks on Activity (%) 
 
 
A. GDP 
 
 
 
 
B. Consumption 
 
 
 
 
C. Investment 
 
 
Note: Years after the shock in horizontal axes.90% confidence bands.
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Figure 5.The Effect of Social Spending Categories on Consumption (Elasticities-%) 
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Note: Years after the shock in horizontal axes. Solid lines=average response. Dotted lines=90% confidence bands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 1 2 3 4
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 1 2 3 4
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 1 2 3 4
31 
 
Figure 6.The Effect of Social Spending Categories on Investment (Elasticities-%) 
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Note: Years after the shock in horizontal axes. Solid lines=average response. Dotted lines=90% confidence bands. 
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ANNEX 
Data for social spending are taken from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. The 
database includes internationally comparable statistics on public and (mandatory and voluntary) 
private social expenditure at programme level. The main social policy areas covered are: Old 
age, Survivors, Incapacity-related benefits, Health, Family, Active labour market programmes, 
Unemployment, Housing, and Other social policy areas. The database is updated periodically, 
every two years and covers several OECD countries from 1980 to 2005. The table below reports 
for each country and for each social policy area the first year for which data are available.   
Table A1-Data Availability 
 TOT OLD SUR INC HEA FAM ACT UNE HOU OTH 
AUS 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1985 1980 1980 1980 
AUT 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1985 1980 1980 1980 
BEL 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1988 1985 1988 - 1988 
CAN 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 
CZE 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1991 1991 1994 1990 
DNK 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1983 
DEU 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1985 1980 1980 1980 
FIN 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 
FRA 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1985 1985 1980 1989 
GRE 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1985 1980 1980 1980 
ICE 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 
IRL 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1985 1985 1980 1980 
ITA 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1990 1980 1980 1990 
JAP 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1990 1980 - 1990 
KOR 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1997 - 1990 
MEX 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1989 1985 - 1985 1985 
NLD 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 
NZL 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 
NOR 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1985 1980 1980 1980 
SVK 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 
SWE 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 
GBR 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 
USA 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 
 
Note:  In the table is reported the first year where the data is available. (-) means missing. 
TOT=Total social spending; OLD=Old Age; SUR=survivors; INC=Incapacity Related; HEA=Health; 
FAM=Family; ACT=Active Labor Market; UNE=Unemployment; HOU=Housing; OTH=Other Policy Areas; 
DNI=Domestic National Income. 
 
